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CHECKMATE: How SEXUAL PREDATORS
IN (YOUR)SPACE HAVE STRATEGICALLY
EMPLOYED EXISTING CYBER-LAWS
TO OUTFLANK THEIR PREY
John Nisbett*
The safety concerns posed by the Internet are part and par-
cel of the safety concerns that arise in human interactions in
the physical world. These concerns are not unique to any
one service or technology platform; they are shared by the
companies that provide Internet services and the individuals
who use these services. We should work together - private
firms, technologists, experts from the non-profit world, and
leaders in government - to solve online safety issues as a
joint effort.'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PLAYERS
With the modern landscape of tech-savvy youths, today's sexual
predators employ online social networking sites ("OSNs") as the new fron-
tier for clandestine hunting grounds. These faceless cyber-sharks-the il-
licit spawn of the robust shelters created by § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA")-have rapidly adapted to the free reign enjoyed in
the unbridled habitat that is the internet.2 This Comment examines the
surprisingly expansive immunity currently afforded to OSNs under the
guise of the CDA. It also endorses the policies of website accountability
and online sex-offender registration as complimentary techniques of com-
bating today's online predator crisis. Lastly, it serves to meet a growing
need for the assemblage of cyber-law related information into an organized
legal paper that explains several emerging concepts of liability for interac-
tive internet service providers.
To these ends, part II explains the concept of social networking sites
and provides a summary of the roots and development of the two most
prominent OSNs: MySpace and Facebook. Part III describes the CDA's
vast protections, including an analysis of its application to lawsuits against
providers of "interactive computer services."3 Next, part IV discusses reg-
ulatory attempts to prevent sexually explicit interactions with children,
* The author thanks the entire faculty and administration at Mississippi College School of Law,
especially Dean Jim Rosenblatt and Professors H. Lee Hetherington and Mark Modak-Truran, for
creating an environment conducive to excellence for inspiring students. I would also like to thank my
wife, Amy, and my son, Will, for their unconditional love and support during my law school career.
1. John Palfrey, Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director, Harvard Law School's Berk-
man Center for Internet and Society.
2. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2002).
3. Id. § 230(c)(2).
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complete with descriptions of Congress' most recent efforts (newly drafted
bills yet to be enacted) to protect against child exploitation. Finally, part V
explores the compilation of three important avenues-implementation of
technology, regulation through law, and increased policing efforts-that,
when applied together, strike the proper balance between internet ad-
vancement, on the one hand, and protection of our children in the new wild
west of cyberspace, on the other.
II. THE GAME: ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES
OSNs are networking sites where users enjoy a wide array of techno-
logical amenities, which seem fantastic to those from the bygone "pen-and-
paper" era. Advantages of these sites include online profiles or personal
webpages that allow for detailed descriptions of the user. The typical pro-
file includes biographical information of all sorts, access to a listing of
friends (and, of course, their profiles), contact information, pictures, per-
sonal blogs (which operate somewhat as a public diary), pictures, and even
videos. The sites employ elaborative networking schemes, whereby an in-
dividual's name or picture is "tagged" so that she is alerted to its use by
others on their respective pages. Much like a glorified email account, the
user is greeted each day with an update of activities that have occurred in
her cyber life. For instance, a typical morning might include alerts to sev-
eral other accounts where a random picture of the user has been posted or
a notice that a certain friend has a new status (single, in a relationship,
etc.). The addictive quality of these sites is evidenced by their cult-like
followings among high-school and college-aged individuals, who are espe-
cially enamored with two sites in particular, MySpace and Facebook.
A. MySpace
In 1998, eUniverse (now known as Intermix Media) created, mar-
keted, and subsequently launched the MySpace social networking website.'
With the concept of free and open use as a central tenet to MySpace's
growth, the site quickly expanded and was eventually bought from Inter-
mix Media in 2005 for $580 million by News Corporation (the parent com-
pany of Fox Broadcasting enterprises).' Believing that MySpace was
actually worth more than $20 billion, Intermix Media's chairman and CEO,
Brad Greenspan,6 called for investigations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the United States Department of Justice, and the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance.' Greenspan, inscensed over the disparity between
4. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, MySpace, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMySpace (last vis-
ited March 10, 2008).
5. Id.
6. Brad Greenspan was the founder and CEO of eUniverse and is widely known as the founder
of MySpace. Wikipedia, Myspace, supra note 4. When the company was later renamed Intermix Me-
dia, Greenspan maintained his position as chairman and CEO. Id.
7. Ecoustics.com, Myspace.com Founder Issues Report Finding News Corp's Myspace Acquisi-
tion Defrauded Shareholders of More Than $20 Billion, Oct. 9, 2006, http://news.ecoustics.com/bbs/
messages/10381/277195.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
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the sale value and his personal estimate of the company's worth, described
the acquisition as "one of the largest merger and acquisition scandals in
U.S. history."8 Nonetheless, the Los Angeles Superior Court eventually
dismissed the lawsuit and allowed the transaction to stand.9
Subsequently, MySpace skyrocketed to the apex of the cyber-world in
2006, "displacing Yahoo's top-rated e-mail gateway and Google's search
site" as "the No. 1 U.S. website."' 0 The site promotes itself as "an online
community that lets you meet your friends' friends" and lists uses that
range from romantic matchmaking to business networking." Although a
source of heated debate, the site currently claims to support more than 100
million users 2-a number that, if considered a country unto itself, would
make the site the 12th most populous nation in the world.' At the very
least, News Corporation's 2005 purchase now seems a coup of staggering
proportions, with analysts estimating the site's value at more than $10 bil-
lion (a conjecture that, if true, at least partially validates Greenspan's
ire).' 4
B. Facebook
Mark Zuckerberg and co-founders Dustin Moskovitz and Chris
Hughes, Harvard sophomores at the time, launched Facebook from their
dorm room in February of 2004 as a means of networking among fellow
Harvardians.1" Soon thereafter, the mechanism quickly spread throughout
the Ivy League and to the rest of the academic world."6 Today the site
allows non-collegiate users and touts itself as "a social utility that helps
people communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and cowork-
ers. The company develops technologies that facilitate the sharing of infor-
mation through the social graph, the digital mapping of people's real-world
social connections."17
Interestingly, Facebook is the sixth most trafficked site in the United
States and "one of the largest MySQL installations anywhere, running
8. Id.
9. Seattlepi.com, Suit over Sale of MySpace Dismissed, News Corp., The Buyer, Says It Feels
'Vindicated', Oct. 10, 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/288111myspacelO.html (last visited
March 10, 2008).
10. USA Today, MySpace Gains Top Ranking of U.S. Websites, July 11, 2006, http:/lwww.
usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-11-myspace-tops-x.htm (last visited March 10, 2008).
11. MySpace.com, About Us, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.aboutus (last
visited March 10, 2008).
12. Frank Ahrens & Peter Whoriskey, News Corp. Discussing Partnership with Yahoo, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
story/2008/02/13/ST2008021303465.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
13. Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social Networks,
6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 (2007).
14. Ahrens & Whoriskey, supra note 12.
15. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Facebook, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilFacebook (last vis-
ited March 10, 2008).
16. Id.
17. Facebook, Press Room, http://www.facebook.com/press.php (last visited March 10, 2008).
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thousands of databases.""s The site enlists an average 250,000 new users
daily, with the only primary requirement for registry being that users main-
tain an active email account." Despite Facebook's tender age, its user-
base has grown to more than 66 million.2 0 Even Microsoft, the nine-hun-
dred-pound gorilla of the computer industry, has invested in Facebook's
growing mystique. In October of 2007, the technology mega-giant agreed
to purchase a $240 million piece of Facebook in a transaction valuing the
site at $15 billion.21
III. THE RULES: THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
AND ITS APPLICATION
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.22 Although it may seem axiomatic that
the so-called "Communications Decency Act" would regulate internet-
communication decency, the CDA, in its current form, refers to § 230 and
relates, by in large, to immunity for internet service providers. Congress'
original version of the CDA also affected the internet in another significant
way: "[I1t attempted to regulate both indecency (when available to chil-
dren) and obscenity in cyberspace." 23 As will be assessed more thoroughly
in section IV, however, the Supreme Court determined that the CDA's reg-
ulatory prong was constitutionally infirm in Reno v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union.2 4
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted "for two basic policy reasons: to
promote the free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and
to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material." 25
These policy concerns are rooted in Congress' recognition that the extent
of information exchanged by way of interactive internet services is stagger-
ing, meaning "[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech
would have an obvious chilling effect." 26 Because interactive service prov-
iders cannot possibly screen all of their countless postings, sites facing lia-
bility for content provided by third parties' likely would opt to significantly
restrict the quantity and nature of messages posted. 27 Hence, Congress de-
cided the balance tipped in favor of speech implications and immunized
18. Facebook, Facebook Jobs (Engineering), http://www.facebook.com/jobs/engineering.php
(last visited March 10, 2008).
19. Facebook, Press Room, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Jay Greene, Microsoft and Facebook Hook Up, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 25, 2007, http://
www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2007/tc20071024_654439.htmchan=top+news-topnews
+index-top+story (last visited March 10, 2008).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
23. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Communications Decency Act, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikilCommunicationsDecencyAct (last visited March 10, 2008).
24. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
25. Carfano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003) (recounting the legislative history and purposes of the CDA)).
26. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
27. Id.
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service providers to prevent such a restrictive effect. 2 8 Acquiring a thor-
ough understanding of the breadth of § 230 immunity, however, demands
not only attention to the rhetoric of the Act itself, but also to its application
to the subsequent wave of litigation that culminated in the flagship child-
predator case Doe v. Myspace, Inc.2 9
A. The Communications Decency Act
The touchstone of § 230 is that providers of interactive websites are
immune from liability for information provided by third parties.30 Impor-
tantly, the Act makes clear that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any infor-
mation provided by another information content providerFalse"3 1 Subsec-
tion (f)(2) of the CDA further defines the term "interactive computer
service" as "any information service, system, or access software provider
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server ... or system that provides access to the internetFalse"3 2 Subsection
(f)(3) also denotes an "information content provider" as "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or develop-
ment of information provided through the InternetFalse" 3
Consequently, OSNs such as MySpace and Facebook "qualif[y] for im-
munity so long as [they do] not also function as an 'information content
provider' for the portion of the statement or publication at issue."34 In
addition, "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be im-
posed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."
Section 230, in short, provides OSNs with nearly blanket immunity from
private lawsuits so that the Internet and other interactive computer services
may continue to flourish, "to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum
of government regulations."36
B. CDA Application
Since its inception in 1996, the lineage of cases expounding upon the
CDA's protections have made one thing certain: The protections of § 230
are "quite robust" so that a cause of action against an OSNs for anything
other than copyright infringement issue is likely a waste of resources.
28. Id.
29. 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
30. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 925 (9th
Cir. 2007), reh'g granted, 506 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2007).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 230(f)(2).
33. Id. § 230(f)(3).
34. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.
35. Id. § 230(e)(3).
36. Id. § 230(a)(4).
37. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.
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1. Setting the Stage: Pre-Doe v. MySpace Cases
In the preceding decade before Doe v. MySpace, courts across the
country applied the CDA in an ironclad manner, utilizing its immunity in
every circumstance that involved an interactive computer service. In Zeran
v. America Online, Inc., a seminal case regarding the application of CDA
immunity, an unidentified individual posted a T-shirt advertisement on an
AOL bulletin board.3 8 In particular, "[t]he posting described the sale of
shirts featuring offensive and tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City."39
The ill-advised prank instructed those interested in purchasing the morbid
apparel to contact "Ken" at Kenneth Zeran's home telephone number.40
As a result, Zeran received a high volume of angry, derogatory messages
and even several death threats.41
Zeran brought suit against AOL, alleging "that [the site] unreasonably
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third
party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for
similar postings thereafter."42 Citing a proposition that derives its signifi-
cance from defamation law, Zeran argued that, because the site was a "dis-
tributor" rather than a "publisher," AOL was not entitled to the CDA's
immunity.4 3 The court was nonetheless unpersuaded: "Although Zeran at-
tempt[ed] to artfully plead his claims as ones of negligence, they are indis-
tinguishable from a garden variety defamation action. Because the
publication of a statement is a necessary element in a defamation action,
only one who publishes can be subject to this form of tort liability." 4 4 Since
AOL fell squarely within the traditional classification of a "publisher," the
site was protected by § 230 immunity.45
In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the issue of
whether an operator of an internet site maintaining an electronic newslet-
ter subjected itself to liability for selecting and publishing allegedly defama-
tory email. 46 The court instructed that "the exclusion of 'publisher' liability
necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of pub-
lishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material pub-
lished while retaining its basic form and message."4 7 While a publisher
could encounter liability for substantial alterations, the Batzel court's hold-
ing turned on the fact that the operator made no material contribution to
the email at issue during the editing process.48




42. Id. at 328.
43. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-32.
44. Id. at 332.
45. Id.
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In a subsequent Ninth Circuit case, Carafano v. Metrosplash, Inc., ac-
tress Christianne Carafano filed a complaint against Matchmaker.com (a
commercial internet dating service).4 9 In Carafano, a third party submitted
a false Matchmaker profile bearing lascivious comments along with
Carafano's personal address and telephone number."o Immediately there-
after, Carafano was inundated with sexually explicit phone calls, emails,
and letters." As a result, the actress and her son were forced to live in
hotels or away from her Los Angeles home for months.52
In what the court characterized as a case of "cruel and sadistic identity
theft[,]" Carafano argued that, because Matchmaker provided a question-
naire that facilitated the expression of information by the site's users, the
site itself was an "information content provider" and, thus, unqualified for
CDA immunity." Much to Carafano's chagrin, the court explained that
"the fact that Matchmaker classifie[d] user characteristics into discrete cat-
egories and collect[ed] responses to specific essay questions [did] not trans-
form Matchmaker into a 'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation.' "
54
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Matchmaker was an information
content provider, the court opined that § 230 precludes treatment as a
speaker for "any information provided by another information content pro-
vider."s5 The CDA, therefore, would still foreclose Carafano's claims un-
less the site created or developed the information that is particularly at
issue-in this case, the personal information about Carafano.56 In the end,
the court held that Matchmaker possessed full CDA immunity."
2. Doe v. MySpace
Doe v. MySpace, a flagship case involving sexual predators' exploita-
tion of interactive websites, represents the quintessential example of the
ultra-rigid immunity currently enjoyed by OSNs. In a 2007 case filed in
Texas district court, MySpace unwittingly allowed Julie Doe, a 13-year-old
girl who admittedly misrepresented her actual age, to create an online pro-
file.59 Soon thereafter, 19-year-old Pete Solis initiated correspondence
with Doe, and the two began to communicate by telephone. 6 0 After sev-
eral weeks, Solis and Doe met for a date, at which point Solis allegedly
perpetrated a sexual assault. 61
49. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1121-22.
52. Id. at 1122.
53. Id. at 1124.
54. Id. (citing Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002)).
55. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added)).
56. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125.
57. Id.
58. 474 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
59. Id. at 846. MySpace terms and conditions require that users be at least 14 years of age in
order to be eligible to maintain an account. MySpace.com, Terms and Conditions, http://www.myspace.
comlindex.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited March 10, 2008).
60. Doe, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
61. Id.
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Doe's allegations presupposed that MySpace "knew sexual predators
were using the service to communicate with minors and failed to react ap-
propriately[.]"6 2 In other words, Doe contended her case was "not based
on MySpace's posting of third-party content, but rather on MySpace's fail-
ure to institute safety measures to protect minors."6 3 The court did not
agree. More pointedly, "[n]o matter how artfully Plaintiffs [sought] to
plead their claims, the . . . Plaintiffs' claims [were] directed toward MyS-
pace in its publishing, editorial, and/or screening capacities."6 4
Interestingly, Doe also attempted to circumvent the CDA's protec-
tions through a more novel approach, claiming that MySpace had a duty to
institute security measures for the protection of minors under state com-
mon law tort theory.6 5 Relying on the rationale of extending premises lia-
bility to the "virtual" context, Doe argued that a duty to protect in fact
arose because "it was foreseeable that minors such as Julie Doe could be
injured by the criminal acts of adult MySpace users." 6 6 As the argument
goes, the site was on notice of several prior instances of adult assaults on
minor users. 7 Accordingly, Doe's sexual assault was not only foreseeable
but also the result of the site's negligent failure to adopt appropriate safety
measures "to prevent contact between sexual predators and minors on its
website."68
The court, however, was unconvinced. Under Texas law, "[a]s a gen-
eral rule, a person has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal
acts of a third person or control the conduct of another." 69 Recognizing
that exceptions to the general rule exist, the court noted that a duty to
protect may arise within the context of employer/employee, parent/child,
and independent contractor/contractee relationships.70 Even so, none of
these exceptions were applicable to MySpace's connection with its users.
Although placing any blame on a 13-year-old seems attenuated at best, the
court quickly dispatched Doe's assertion of third party liability by recount-
ing that she had misrepresented her age, chosen to communicate with an
adult, and provided him with her personal information." Basing its analy-
sis on a comparison to postal and telephone services, the court reasoned
that mere intermediaries are not responsible for ascertaining whether users
plan to effectuate crimes through their services. 72 Furthermore, the court
62. Id. at 848.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 851.
66. Doe, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 850 (quoting Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996)).
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warily declined extension of premises liability to the virtual context, "par-
ticularly where, as here, the Defendant provide[d] its service to users for
free.""
In the sharply written opinion, Judge Sparks infamously remarked that
"[i]f anyone had a duty to protect Julie Doe, it was her parents, not MyS-
pace" and "[t]o impose a duty under these circumstances . . . would of
course stop MySpace's business in its tracks and close this avenue of com-
munication, which Congress in its wisdom has decided to protect. "
Plainly, Doe served as a crushing defeat for potential plaintiffs everywhere,
as it made clear that, at least in Texas, the protections of the CDA are
nearly bulletproof.
3. Post-Doe v. MySpace: A Chink in the CDA's Armor?
After Doe v. MySpace, the seemingly indomitable protections of the
CDA endured a slight hiccup in another Ninth Circuit case: Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC." There, an on-
line roommate matching service, Roommates.com, was sued for alleged vi-
olations of the Fair Housing Act.76 Despite Roommates' undisputed status
as an "interactive service provider" within the meaning of § 230, the Fair
Housing Council alleged the site was more than a mere publisher of infor-
mation provided by its users.7 7 Instead, the Council insisted that Room-
mates was an "information content provider" because the site created,
posted, required completion of, and distributed by email the informational
questionnaires.78 In a fractured opinion issued by a three-member panel,
the court determined that, because Roommates created the information
forms used to generate user profiles, the site was, in fact, an information
content provider.79 Also, "[b]y categorizing, channeling and limiting the
distribution of users' profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of
information" sufficient to make it "'responsible' at least 'in part' for creat-
ing or developing" content.s0 The court remanded Roommates.com for a
determination by the trial court of whether the site had in fact violated the
Fair Housing Acts, but the potentially far-reaching effects of the case gave
notice to plaintiffs and OSNs alike that, for the first time, the CDA ap-
peared vulnerable.
For better or worse, the Roommates.com court made a substantial in-
terpretative leap in CDA application that, if widely accepted, could hold
OSNs liable in future cases. For example, both Roommates.com and MyS-
pace.com offer user-created accounts created by user-supplied answers,
73. Id.
74. Id. at 852.
75. 489 F.3d 921, 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
76. Id. at 924.
77. Id. at 925.
78. Id. at 926.
79. Id. at 926.
80. Id. at 929.
81. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 489 F.3d at 929-30.
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which are then arranged for display through an organized method.8 2 While
the services offer different types of information, the sites employ substan-
tially similar processes of soliciting, editing, and displaying the informa-
tion." If the court in Doe v. MySpace had utilized the less restrictive
interpretation of the term "information content provider" employed by the
Roommates.com court, without taking into account the substance of the
user-supplied information, MySpace's profile creation techniques and
searchable database might have created the "additional layer" of informa-
tion necessary to incur liability.'
Nevertheless, the resilience of CDA immunity was not to be outdone,
as the Roommates.com holding lasted less than five months before the
court vacated its decision in favor of an en banc review." The Ninth Cir-
cuit has yet to re-consider its opinion of the Roommates.com case, and it
seems likely that the case will be decided differently the second time
around. Interestingly, the timing of the Ninth Circuit's review of the
Roommates.com decision likely will play a decisive role in the outcome of
four more recently filed lawsuits against MySpace filed in Los Angeles Su-
perior Court:
The details aren't pleasant. The plaintiffs are a 15-year-old
Pennsylvania girl who was kidnapped and sexually assaulted
in 2006; a 15-year-old Texas girl who was drugged and sexu-
ally assaulted (also in 2006) before being tracked down by
the Houston police and the FBI; a 14-year-old New York
girl who was given alcohol, drugs and assaulted by two men;
and two South Carolina sisters, aged 14 and 15 who were
also given alcohol, drugs and were assaulted. All the adult
MySpace users involved have either been arrested, are on
trial, or are currently serving jail sentences. The families
want payouts in the "millions of dollars."8 6
Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's final prognosis concerning CDA im-
munity, plaintiffs everywhere have assuredly taken notice of the rationale,
albeit vacated, in Roommates.com limiting CDA immunity within certain
contexts.
82. Jon Burns, Note, Doe v. Sexsearch.com: Placing Real-Life Liability Back Where It Belongs in
a Virtual World, 9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 69, 82 (2007).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716 (9th Cir.
2007).
86. Pete Cashmore, MySpace Sued By Parents Who Don't Keep an Eye on their Kids, Mashable
Social Networking News, Jan. 18, 2007, http://mashable.com/2007/01/18/myspace-sued-after-girls-
sexually-abused/ (last visited March 10, 2008).
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IV. THE SHIELD: LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
By in large, Congress' attempts to regulate cyberspace in favor of
greater protections for children have failed to pass constitutional muster.
Indeed, the CDA-Congress' first attempt at internet regulation for the
sake of child safety-was besieged on all sides from its outset by detractors
claiming offense to the First Amendment. A growing national consensus in
favor of reform, however, has yet to be alleviated, signaling that future
Congressional measures might one day fracture the airtight immunity for
OSNs.
A. Past Regulatory Measures
To date, Congress has approved three laws aimed at regulating inde-
cency on the internet: the CDA, COPA, and CIPA. Of these three, the
Supreme Court upheld only the CIPA, an incentive package designed to
induce the implementation of filters in libraries, as constitutional.
1. CDA Regulation: Strike One
Less than one year after its enactment in 1996, the Supreme Court's
decision in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union quickly displaced the
CDA's regulation of internet indecency and obscenity. "Notwithstanding
the legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting chil-
dren from harmful materials," the Court "agree[d] . . . that the statute
abridge[d] 'the freedom of speech' protected by the First Amendment.""
In Reno, the Court found that the CDA contained content-based blanket
restrictions on speech and that the challenged provisions were facially
overbroad:88
We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the
First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the con-
tent of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially
harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and to address to one another. That burden on
adult speech is unacceptabic if less rcstrictive alternntivefs
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate pur-
pose that the statute was enacted to serve.89
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, described the breadth of the
Act's coverage as "wholly unprecedented" and noted that "existing tech-
nology" (referring to internet filtering devices) afforded an avenue
whereby minors' access to explicit content could be restricted without in-
fringing on the rights of adult who sought to view that same content.90 The
87. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
88. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. at 844.
89. Id. at 874.
90. Id. at 876-77.
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Court determined that the government failed to meet the "heavy burden"
of demonstrating that a "less restrictive provision would not be as effective
as the CDA."9 1 In the aftermath of Reno, Congress has fervently at-
tempted to institute legislation which both (1) passes constitutional muster
and (2) accomplishes its goal of protecting children in cyberspace.
2. COPA: Same Song, Second Verse
In reaction to the constitutional infirmities of the CDA, Congress
passed the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") in 1998.92 COPA's
drafters sought to address Reno's concern that the CDA's controversial
terms "indecency" and "patently offensive" were overly vague.9 3 Accord-
ingly, COPA used a "harmful to minors" qualifier that conformed to stan-
dards previously ratified by the Court.94 The statute "provide[d] both
criminal and civil penalties for transmitting sexually explicit materials and
communications over the World Wide Web which are available to minors
and harmful to them." 95
Not surprisingly, the COPA, much like the CDA, failed to survive judi-
cial scrutiny as the least restrictive means of controlling potentially harmful
internet communications. Again, less than one year after enactment, a fed-
eral district court determined that the bill was presumptively invalid and
issued a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.9 6 Soon thereafter,
the Supreme Court provided a glimmer of hope for the bill by granting
certiorari. Nonetheless, despite vacating the lower court's decision, the
Court upheld the injunction and merely remanded the case for further fac-
tual determinations. In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas noted that
"plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute" existed: "[b]locking
and filtering software is an alternative that is less restrictive than COPA
and, in addition, likely more effective as a means of restricting children's
access to materials harmful to them." 9 7
91. Id. at 879.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
93. Namita E. Mani, Judicial Scrutiny of Congressional Attempts To Protect Children From the
Internet's Harm: Will Internet Filtering Technology Provide the Answer Congress Has Been Looking
For?, 9 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 201, 203 (2003).
94. Id. at 203-04 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 13 (1998)) ("H.R. 3783 conforms to the stan-
dards identified in Ginsberg [v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)], as modified by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). H.R. 3783 modifies 'patently offensive' language by explicitly
describing the material that is harmful to minors.").
95. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The Court
limited COPA's coverage from the entire internet, as with the CDA, to merely the World Wide Web.
Whereas "[the Internet is a massive network of networks, a networking infrastructure[,] . . . [t]he
World Wide Web . . . is a way of accessing information over the medium of the Internet. It is an
information-sharing model that is built on top of the Internet." Webopedia.com, The Difference Be-
tween the Internet and the World Wide Web, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/
Internet/2002/Web_vs_Internet.asp (last visited March 10, 2008).
96. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
97. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666-67 (2004).
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Thus, it came as no surprise that on March 22, 2007, a federal district
court, bolstered by the "supreme" rationale from Ashcroft, issued a perma-
nent injunction against COPA's enforcement.9 8 The ACLU v. Gonzales
court's decision also set forth two surprising, yet suspect, conclusions of
fact.99 First, based on the expert testimony of a single associate research
professor, the court determined that existing filtering tools were 95 percent
effective with regard to restricting minors' access to sexually explicit infor-
mation.'00 Even if the court's determination proved accurate, the effi-
ciency of filtering devices becomes much less attractive when couched in
terms of current estimates that suggest over 77 million children regularly
access the internet.101 Also, the court realized that no evidence exists indi-
cating that age verification services on the market "actually reliably estab-
lish or verify the age of Internet users" and that, moreover, the cost-
prohibitive nature of such devices chill speech. 102 The court concluded that
COPA's broad terminology was not only overinclusive, but the statute did
not protect against the vast amount of information originating overseas,
making it also underinclusive.103
3. CIPA: A Starting Point
In December 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Children's
Internet Protection Actl0 4 ("CIPA"), which incentivizes the use of filters in
public libraries: "Under CIPA, a public library may not receive federal as-
sistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block
images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent mi-
nors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them."' Ex-
pectedly, CIPA's enactment was met with swift resistance.
Libraries and website publishers alike alleged the incentives would
"induce public libraries to violate the First Amendment by imposing con-
tent-based restrictions on their patrons' access to constitutionally protected
public speech."' 0 6 While the district court agreed, specifying that it would
be "impossible" to create a filter that "neither underblocks nor overblocks
a substantial amount of speech,"' 0 7 the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of CIPA, subject to the condition that "librarian[s] [must] unblock
filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant
98. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 777-78.
99. Roxanne E. Christ, Jeanne S. Berges, & Shannon C. Trevino, Social Networking Sites: To
Monitor or Not To Monitor Users and Their Content?, 19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13 (2007).
100. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 795.
101. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Child Predator Cyber Crime
Unit (2008) http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsflMain/DF75DF6F54BDA68E8525727B00645478 (last
visited March 10, 2008).
102. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
103. Id. at 810-11.
104. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
105. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
106. Mani, supra note 93, at 206 (citing Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d
401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
107. Mani, supra note 93, at 207 (citing Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. at
437).
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delay on an adult user's request."10 8 Surprisingly, the Court determined
that CIPA was "a valid exercise of Congress' spending power" and allowed
the law to stand.' 09
B. Pending Regulatory Measures
Growing support for new methods of enhancing internet safety for
children has generated a multitude of new proposals via the traditional leg-
islative channels. Four such bills-DOPA, SAFETY, KIDS, and SAFE-
are currently trapped at various congressional stages but might one day
become additional protections (even if only for a fleeting moment).
1. DOPA
In 2006, the Deleting Online Predators Act ("DOPA") was first intro-
duced into the House of Representatives as the first congressional attempt
to limit children's exposure to internet dangers through an incentive pro-
gram."10 In essence, DOPA would "require schools and libraries receiving
federal funding to restrict minors' access to social networking sites and chat
rooms.""' Individuals would still be allowed to access these sites under
supervision, but only for educational purposes.112
On July 26, 2006, the bill finally passed through the House of Repre-
sentatives. One day later, despite having received overwhelming support
from the House, the Senate proverbially sentenced DOPA to a legislative
death by referring the bill to committee rather than putting it to a vote.'1 3
DOPA has twice since been reintroduced into the Senate (most recently in
January 2007 as part of the larger legislative package entitled "Protecting
Children in the 21st Century Act"). Each time the bill was immediately
referred to committee where inaction stifled the measure.114
2. SAFETY
On February 6, 2007, the Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Ex-
ploitation of Today's Youth Act ("SAFETY") was introduced into the
House."i5 If enacted, SAFETY would create a federal offense for know-
ingly engaging in conduct that "facilitates access to child pornography."" 6
108. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 196.
109. Id. at 214.
110. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006, http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/DeletingOnlinePredatorsActof_2006#_note-thomas (last visited March 10,
2008).
111. Christ, Berges & Trevino, supra note 99, at 16.
112. Id.
113. Wikipedia, Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006, supra note 110.
114. Id.
115. H.R. 837, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
116. Christ, Berges & Trevino, supra note 99, at 16 (citing H.R. 837 § 4(a)).
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It would also amend the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 so that in-
ternet service providers who even negligently fail to report child pornogra-
phy would, incur strict penalties."' The bill expands already existing
reporting requirements by including OSNs in the group of "electronic com-
munication service providers" that currently operate under a similar mea-
sure. SAFETY was referred to committee and has yet to be considered for
vote.
3. KIDS
In what is perhaps the most exciting new bill up for debate, the Keep-
ing the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act ("KIDS"), in addition to
creating a new offense for offenders who misrepresent their age online,
"would expand the information that registered offenders must report and
periodically update by requiring them to provide self-identifying informa-
tion used on the Internet, including email addresses and screen names."11
Importantly, the implementation of KIDS would coordinate effectively
with measures already in place: The Lychner Act of 1996 already mandates
the establishment of "a national database that tracks the location and
movements of each person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
against a victim who is a minor, has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense, or is a sexually violent predator."' 20 Regarding the bill's financial
burdens of implementation, the KIDS Act would require very little (if any)
administrative costs because offenders are currently already required to
register with the Federal Bureau of Investigations. By unanimous vote,
KIDS swept through the House on November 14, 2007. Next, the bill was
introduced into the Senate and uniformly agreed upon by the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee. In typical yet confusing fashion, the Senate stalled its
vote on the measure so that it still awaits realization.121
4. SAFE
The Securing Adolescents From Exploitation-Online Act ("SAFE")
represents Congress' most recent attempt to curb internet indecency. 22
The SAFE Act is a bipartisan U.S. House bill designed to increase report-
ing requirements for known illegal visual media on the internet.123 Like
117. Open Congress.org, Internet Stopping Adults Facilitating the Exploitation of Today's Youth
Act (SAFETY) of 2007, http://www.opencongress.orgfbill/110-h837/show (last visited March 10, 2008).
118. Id.
119. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, Jan. 18, 2008,
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8940/s431.pdf (last visited March 10, 2008).
120. FBI.gov, Crimes Against Children, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/registry-background.htm
(last visited March 10, 2008).
121. Catherine Rampell, Registry May Soon Add Sex Offenders' Web IDs, THE WASHINGTON
PosT, Dec. 15, 2007, at D2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/
14/AR2007121401734.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
122. H.R. 3791, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
123. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, Securing Adolescents From Exploitation-Online Act of
2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilSecuringAdolescentsFromExploitation-OnlineAct-of.2007 (last
visited March 10, 2008).
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the SAFETY Act, the SAFE Act specifies that internet service providers
who obtain "actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances" of illegal vis-
ual media (usually child pornography) must report the instance to the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children.124 The SAFE Act's
broad language would encompass individuals, libraries, coffee shops, ho-
tels, social-networking sites, internet service providers, domain name regis-
trars, and even email service providers.125
After the SAFETY Act stalled in the Senate nearly a year earlier,
Democratic leadership "rushed the SAFE Act to the floor under a proce-
dure that's supposed to be reserved for noncontroversial legislation." 126
The bill "never received even one hearing or committee vote" before being
overwhelmingly approved by the House on December 5, 2007, with only
Republicans Paul Broun and Ron Paul voting against the measure.127 The
bill was introduced in the Senate on the December 6, 2007, and is currently
in committee.128
To summarize, legislative efforts to provide society with weapons for
the battle against online predators, while noble in theory, have thus far
provided only nominal help. The CIPA remains the lone statute that the
Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional. Although the CIPA assuredly
aids in the process (even if only minimally) of curtailing unsupervised child
access to potentially dangerous sites, much greater efforts are needed. In
other words, regulatory measures alone will never provide the level of pro-
tection needed to adequately combat child predators. Instead, they re-
present only a fraction of the efforts needed to impact the crisis.
V. THE STRATEGY: A CALL TO ARMS
Realistically, the online sexual predator crisis can only be expected to
proliferate exponentially as the computer age advances. Despite reasona-
ble expectations that technological progress will breed greater security in-
novations, the current circumstance cannot and should not be ignored. In
the wake of Doe v. MySpace, much debate ensued regarding proposals for
deterrence mechanisms. Thus far, however, these discussions have yielded
only one consensus: No single "right" answer exists.
In order to minimize children's exposure to online predators, society
must embrace the challenge through collaborative, focused efforts that can
generally be categorized into a three-pronged approach: (1) implementa-
tion of technology by OSNs themselves, (2) regulation through law, and (3)
increased policing efforts to control the unwanted social behavior itself.
Admittedly, none of these three approaches-in and of itself-can sharply
124. H.R. 3791 § 2, 94th Cong. (2007).
125. Declan McCullagh, House Vote On Illegal Images Sweeps in Wi-Fi, Web Sites, CNet.com,
Dec. 5, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9829759-38.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. GovTrack.us, H.R. 3791, SAFE Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=
h110-3791 (last visited March 10, 2008).
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impact the current dilemma. Their simultaneous utilization, however, will
create a "web" of protection that impacts the problem.
A. Implementation of Technology by OSNs
Certainly it can be argued that, because OSNs have become the "child
predator[']s new playground[,]" the sites themselves should bear some re-
sponsibility for society's current predicament. 1 2 9 Although "[t]here is no
substitute for a parent to . . . keep supervision over their child[,] . . . the
industry of social networking sites needs to step up to the plate and take on
some corporate responsibility [to] make the parent's job easier. "130
In 2007, MySpace finally began to shoulder some of the burden. After
announcing its partnership with Sentinel Tech Holding Corporation to cre-
ate a database of registered sex offenders, the site released a July 2007
statement that proclaimed identification and deletion of over 29,000 of-
fender accounts.1 3 1 In addition, MySpace announced policy changes that
entail automatic privacy of fourteen and fifteen-year-old children and ex-
ploration of a "children's email registry."' 32 Facebook, too, seems to be
waking up to the realities of the marketplace. Despite not having access to
the database created by MySpace and Sentinel Tech, the site reportedly is
taking a cue from its competitors by exploring similar options.
Both MySpace and Facebook also employ minimum age requirements.
Although sharply criticized as ineffective, a 2006 MySpace effort report-
edly deleted some 250,000 accounts of underage users. MySpace's ac-
tions represent a step in the right direction, but minimum age
requirements, without age verification measures, act as mere unenforceable
facades.
To the contrary, detractors argue that age verification is simply not a
realistic, workable solution because no records exist for minor children.134
Furthermore, some contend that the development of age verification de-
vices would actually further endanger children by providing them with a
129. Jay Chaudhuri, Special Counsel to North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper, Progress
and Freedom Foundation Policy Seminar on Age Verification and Social Networking (March 23, 2007)
(transcript at 4) (transcript available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl4.8ageverificationtran
script.pdf (last visited March 10, 2008)).
130. Id. (transcript at 5).
131. Gary D. Robertson, MySpace: 29,000 sex offenders have profiles, msnbc.com, July 24, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19936355/ (last visited March 10, 2008).
132. Frederick Lane, MySpace Promises Better Protection of Children, TopTechNews.com, Jan. 15,
2008, http://www.toptechnews.com/story.xhtml?story-title=mySpacePromisesBetterProtectionof_
Children&story.id=030002R99ZGC (last visited March 10, 2008).
133. ConsumerAffairs.com, MySpace Names Security Czar, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.consumer
affairs.com/news04/2006/04/myspace-czar.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
134. John Cardillo, President and CEO of Sentinel Tech Holding Corporation, Progress and Free-
dom Foundation Policy Seminar on age verification and social networking (March 23, 2007) (transcript
at 5) (transcript available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl4.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf
(last visited March 10, 2008)). Cardillo's company (Sentinel) introduced Sentinel SAFE, a premier sex
offender tool, in December 2006. Interestingly, Sentinal SAFE's first partner was MySpace.com.
"[Age Verification] just doesn't work .... There's no data on kids. As much as we want to believe there
is, there isn't. There is no way to connect an adult to a child." Id.
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false sense of security as to other users."'s These individuals assert that,
because no security measures are 100% effective, the verification does
nothing more than create a false sense of security. 1 3 6
Nevertheless, society cannot sacrifice the good to the perfect. The
idea that implementation of protective devices such as age verification
could harm children defies rational explanation. Minors, for instance, un-
doubtedly endeavor to create fake identification for the purpose of
presenting themselves as adults (for various, unlawful reasons!).137 Should
society abandon its mandate that individuals must be of age to engage in
certain activities because of these deviates' actions? Certainly such an ar-
gument would be an untenable, if not ridiculous, position. Unfortunately,
because of Congress' mandate that the internet remain unencumbered, on-
line age verification seems almost "akin to age verification in a hotel park-
ing lot."13 s
In January, 2008, in response to the ongoing public outcry for greater
internet safety, a nation-wide task force was assembled to cultivate ideas
for greater protections. 139  The Internet Safety Technical Task Force,
headed by leading Internet scholars from Harvard Law School, incorpo-
rates the efforts MySpace along with all attorneys general except Texas' in
the effort to combat internet sex predators: "The group will have a broad
mandate to explore technical ways to keep children safe-not only from
sexual predators but also from online bullies and adult content."140 Specifi-
cally, the unit will attempt to establish realistic, effective procedures for age
verification of users.141
On a local level, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood recently an-
nounced a second new agreement between MySpace and ten other states
that will allow parents to remove their children's profiles altogether. 14 2
The arrangement, announced on January 14, 2008, provides that parents
135. Jeff Schmidt, CEO of Authis, Progress and Freedom Foundation Policy Seminar on age ver-
ification and social networking (March 23, 2007) (transcript at 9) (transcript available at http://www.
pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/popl4.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf (last visited March 10, 2008)). Schmidt is
a noted information security expert, author, and speaker. He is also a founder of the InfraGard Na-
tional Members Alliance, the private sector component of the FBI's InfraGard Program (InfraGard is
an FBI/private sector alliance dedicated to improving and extending information sharing between pri-
vate industry and the government on matters of national security). Schmidt helped the FBI create the
InfraGard Program in 1998.
136. Id. (transcript at 9).
137. See Chaudhuri, supra note 129, at 21.
138. See Schmidt, supra note 135, at 23.
139. Msnbc.com, Harvard Scholars Head MySpace Task Force, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/23391412/ (last visited March 10, 2008).
140. Id. "Initial participants include leading Internet companies such as Google Inc., Microsoft
Corp., Yahoo Inc., Time Warner Inc.'s AOL and MySpace rival Facebook, along with Internet access
providers and nonprofit groups." Id. Moreover, "although MySpace was in charge of creating the
group, naming its members and choosing Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society to run it,
the task force will be independent of MySpace, according to John Palfrey, Berkman's executive direc-
tor." Id.
141. Id.
142. Natalie Chandler, MySpace To Make Changes Limiting Youths' Access, ClarionLedger.com,
Jan. 14, 2008, http://clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080114/NEWS/80114016/-1/archive
(last visited March 10, 2008). Article on file with the author.
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can delete their child's profile using the Parent Care Email and Parent
Care Hotline on MySpace.143 Also under the agreement, MySpace will
create closed high school classes that allow only students under the age of
eighteen and from the same school to browse within the group.1
Even though the recent efforts of internet service providers such as
MySpace undoubtedly signify that good-faith concessions are in the works,
detractors lie in wait (as always) for inevitable challenges. With this in
mind, watchdog groups have been given their place at the table in the dis-
cussions.145 These groups remain skeptical that a viable solution can be
achieved, as Washington-based Center for Democracy and Technology
spokesperson Brock Meeks remarked:
How do you make a bulletproof age-verification policy
without violating constitutionally protected rights? How
does a piece of technology know who's at the other end?
How can an electronic gatekeeper know whether I'm a mi-
nor or adult? Every time I go to a site, do I have to prove
who I am? You may be limiting my rights because you're
putting a burden on my ability to access information I have
every right to access.146
As it stands, however, the development of age verification techniques
should not be overemphasized. MySpace's creation of a sex offender
database, along with the Internet Safety Technical Task Force, signals that
the first piece in this evolving puzzle has already begun to take effect.
OSNs need only the continued support of government resources in order to
actively engage the enemy.
B. Laws and Regulations
Despite the sentiments of constitutional law pundits who readily
champion First Amendment concerns at the first notion of government reg-
ulation, the current relationship between privacy and child protection re-
mains unbalanced and ineffective. It follows, then, that detractors of
increased regulatory measures must yield to one simple truth: Society en-
acts laws to protect children because they lack the judgment and maturity
to discern good decisions from bad. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, real-
izing that social networking sites commingle children and sexually inter-
ested adults, wisely upheld the CIPA's enactment as a constitutional
attempt to shield America's youth from the unsupervised use of OSNs in
schools and public libraries.' Yet CIPA unfortunately remains the only
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Jim Offner, Harvard Law Researchers to Helm Social Net Safety Group, Ecommerce-
Times.com, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/web20/61882.html?welcome=12043
18415 (last visited March 10, 2008).
146. Id.
147. See Chaudhuri, supra note 129, at 21.
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prophylactic tool Congress has allotted for societal protection against
predators.
Revolutionizing the social networking industry in favor of greater
safety may indeed depend largely on Congress' ability to pass legislation
that would require sexual predators to register their email addresses (the
KIDS Act). Many states, including Connecticut, Kentucky, Virginia, and
others, have already considered enacting such a measure on a local level.' 48
The rationale for this bill might seem elusive at first blush. Nonetheless, its
force could potentially rid OSNs of sexual predators. Most sites, including
MySpace and Facebook, require first time users to verify their age and sub-
mit an email address. Because KIDS would make it a felony for sex of-
fenders to fail in their duty to register any existing email address they
possess or misrepresent their age online, these individuals would be pre-
cluded from hiding behind fake profiles without risking dire consequences.
With its recent compilation of a sex offender database and expulsion
of over 29,000 offender profiles, MySpace has proven its commitment to
ferreting out online predators. Put differently, only sex offenders operating
under bogus profiles maintain accounts. Although no system is perfect, the
end run of KIDS seems abundantly clear: The vast majority of predators
could no longer exploit dummy profiles. KIDS would equip MySpace with
offender email addresses with which the site could quickly assimilate into
its already existing databanks. And even in circumstances where offenders
manipulate the system, KIDS would compel these individuals to commit
one (or both) of the KIDS-created felonies of online age misrepresentation
or nondisclosure of registry information. This fact would ensure that, when
caught, offenders would severely pay for their evasive techniques.
Finally, even the enactment of a law in the mold of SAFE would aid in
the struggle to rid the internet of online predators. Because SAFE "widens
the circle of companies that would be required to report child porn to in-
clude chat room and social networking companies," the Act would enable
law enforcement agencies locate criminals more readily.149 Although indi-
viduals posting child pornography cannot, in every instance, be equated
with active predators who create the images, the two groups certainly oper-
ate with substantial overlap. By more efficiently prosecuting individuals
who transmit child pornography via social networking sites, more cyber-
predators implicitly will be detained before perpetrating sex crimes against
children. With OSNs and greater legal protections on board, only one
piece of the puzzle would remain: increased police efforts.
148. Susan Haigh, States May Require Sex Offenders to Give Email, msnbc.com, May 24, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18853712/ (last visited March 10, 2008).
149. iTnews.com, New Bill Increases Penalties for ISPs that Fail to Report Online Child Porn, Feb
8, 2007, http://www.itnews.com.aulNews/NewsStory.aspx?story=45546 (last visited March 10, 2008).
Article on file with the author.
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C. Increased Policing Efforts
Both implementation of technology and regulation through laws serve
as effective defensive techniques in the battle to curb online child exploita-
tion. By the same token, offensive strategies that attack the objectionable
behavior from the opposite end, so to speak, must be coordinated on a
nationwide level in order to achieve maximum efficiency. Despite the de-
velopment of numerous individual state and local cyber crime task forces,
the wide-open nature of the internet cannot be adequately policed through
disjointed efforts.
To this end, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales established Project
Safe Childhood ("PSC") in 2006 "to combat the proliferation of technol-
ogy-facilitated sexual exploitation crimes against children."'5 0 PSC aims to
establish a maximum level of coordination by "linking together federal,
state, local, and tribal law enforcement, prosecutors, community leaders,
and nonprofit entities specializing in prevention and outreach.""s' Al-
though the program undoubtedly sets forth an incredible blueprint for suc-
cess with increased sentences for offenders, better training for authorities
and personalized strategies tailored for specific districts, the project has yet
to realize its potential. In order to recognize meaningful progress, individ-
ual states must join hands in the struggle.
Leading the way, Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, along with
the Mississippi Cyber Crime Task Force, implemented the first ever institu-
tion where "state, federal and local authorities are housed in one location
to fight cyber crime[.]"152 1In July of 2007, the aptly named Cyber Crime
Fusion Center ("MCCFC") was announced as "a coalition of investigators,
examiners, prosecutors and educators led by the Cyber Crimes Division of
the Mississippi Attorney General's Office."15 3 In addition to the methods
utilized by Mississippi's Cyber Crime Task Force, Attorney General Albert
Gonzales designated a portion of the institution's office space for Project
Safe Childhood so that the program coordinators can effectively work
jointly with state investigators. Gonzales remains "hopeful that the coop-
eration between local, state and federal officials in Mississippi can serve as
an example" for others around the nation.154
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet's future may be brighter if technical processes
are refined to permit easier identification of Internet users,
150. U.S. Department of Justice, Project Safe Childhood: A Basic Overview, Project-
SafeChildhood.gov, http://www.projectsafechildhood.gov/part3.pdf (last visited March 10, 2008).
151. Id.
152. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Attorney General Hood
Opens "First in the Nation" Cyber Crime Center (July 31, 2007) http://www.ago.state.ms.us/index.phpl
press/releases/attorney-general-hood-opensjfirst in thenationcyberscrime-center/ (last visited
March 10, 2008).
153. Id. At the Fusion Center's dedication, Attorney General Hood remarked that "[t]here is
strength in numbers, so perverts beware." Id.
154. Id.
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alongside legal processes-and perhaps technical limita-
tions-to ensure that such identification is only made with
good cause. . . . But insofar as technologically guaranteed
anonymity is retained, more drastic means to eliminate indi-
vidual wrongdoing through gatekeeper intervention wait in
the wings.15 5
Unfortunately, the current online child exploitation crisis will, at least
to some degree, forever remain a thorn in side of interactive internet de-
vices. Society, therefore, stands at a delicate crossroad: We may either con-
tinue down the path of unabashed internet openness or set a new course
that will allow for greater protections with which to hold accountable both
service providers and users who run roughshod over our laws. Ironically,
the long-term consequences of continuing with the anonymous, free-for-all
system currently in place could quite possibly serve to, at some point, fore-
close the question altogether by, proverbially speaking, killing the goose
that laid the golden egg.
In the intermediate, Congress must equip OSNs with the tools to at
least marginally safeguard the system. Because user verification systems
remain an elusive prospect, a legislative mandate of online registration for
sex offenders would provide sites with the ability to expel the vast majority
of predators, while forcing those operating under false pretenses into the
precarious position of further prosecution if realized by authorities. In ad-
dition, the formation of an interconnected system of task forces with the
unified goal of policing interactions on social networking sites would pro-
vide the final touches for a strengthened, yet inherently flawed, system.
155. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2038 (2006).
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